Varieties of Consciousness

Bennett L. Schwartz

Florida International University

Michael J. Beran

Georgia State University

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Abstract

It is parsimonious to assume that animals solve issues of internal representation and cognitive flexibility in similar ways to us. We think that multiple mechanisms that different animals use to accomplish similar outcomes is an important issue to consider when thinking about awareness and consciousness. As such, the nature of awareness and consciousness may differ across species. To illustrate these points, we discuss differences across species in episodic memory, blindsight, and visual illusions and what these differences mean for understanding consciousness in nonhuman animals.

Keywords :  consciousness, non-human consciousness, awareness, non-human awareness, episodic memory, blindsight, visual illusions

Author Note 
Bennett Schwartz, Department of Psychology, DM 283, Florida International University , Miami, FL 33029.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Bennett Schwartz at 
schwartb@fiu.edu

Michael Beran, Department of Psychology, Georgia State University, P.O. Box 5010, Atlanta, GA 30302-5010.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Michael Beran at 
mberan1@gsu.edu