Volume 4: pp. 29-39

Metacognition in animals: how do we know that they know?

J. Jozefowiez,
Universidade do Minho

J. E. R. Staddon,
Duke University

D. T. Cerutti,
California State University-East Bay

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Abstract

Research on animal metacognition has typically used choice discriminations whose difficulty can be varied. Animals are given some opportunity to escape the discrimination task by emitting a so-called uncertain response. The usual claim is that an animal possesses metacognition if (a) the probability of picking the uncertain response increases with task difficulty, and (b) animals are more accurate on “free-choice” trials —i.e., trials where the uncertain response was available but was not chosen—than on “forced-choice” trials, where the uncertain response is unavailable. We describe a simple behavioral economic model (BEM), based on familiar learning principles, and thus lacking any metacognition construct, which is able to meet both criteria in most of these tasks. We conclude that rather than designing ever more complex experiments to identify “metacognition,” a necessarily ill-defined concept, knowledge might better be advanced not by further refining behavioral criteria for the concept, but by the development and testing of theoretical models for the clever behavior that many animals show in these experiments.

Keywords: metacognition, comparative metacognition, uncertainty monitorying, metamemory, quantitative modeling

Jozefowiez, J., Staddon, J. E. R., & Cerutti, D.T. (2009). Metacognition in animals: how do we know that they know? Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 4, 29-39. Retrieved from https://comparative-cognition-and-behavior-reviews.org/ doi:10.3819/ccbr.2009.40003

Volume 4: pp. 17-28

Multiple demonstrations of metacognition in nonhumans: Converging evidence or multiple mechanisms?

by Robert R. Hampton,
Emory University

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Abstract

Metacognition allows one to monitor and adaptively control cognitive processes. Reports from the last 15 years show that when given the opportunity, nonhuman animals selectively avoid taking difficult tests of memory or perception, collect more information if needed before taking tests, or “gamble” more food reward on correct than on incorrect responses in tests of memory and perception. I review representative examples from this literature, considering the sufficiency of four classes of mechanism to account for the metacognitive performance observed. This analysis suggests that many of the demonstrations of metacognition in nonhumans can be explained in terms of associative learning or other mechanisms that do not require invoking introspection or access to private mental states. Consideration of these accounts may prompt greater appreciation of the diversity of metacognitive phenomena and may inform theoretical positions about the nature of the mental representations underlying metacognition.

Keywords: awareness, cognitive control, confidence, consciousness, declarative, explicit, introspection, memory, memory monitoring, metacognition, metamemory

Hampton, R. R. (2009). Multiple demonstrations of metacognition in nonhumans: Converging evidence or multiple mechanisms? Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 4, 17-28. Retrieved from https://comparative-cognition-and-behavior-reviews.org/ doi:10.3819/ccbr.2009.40002

Volume 4: pp. 1-16

Metacognition in animals

by Jonathon D. Crystal,
University of Georgia

Allison L. Foote,
University of Georgia

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Abstract

Metacognition is thinking about thinking. There is considerable interest in developing animal models of metacognition to provide insight about the evolution of mind and a basis for investigating neurobiological mechanisms of cognitive impairments in people. Formal modeling of low-level (i.e., alternative) mechanisms has recently demonstrated that prevailing standards for documenting metacognition are inadequate. Indeed, low-level mechanisms are sufficient to explain data from existing methods. Consequently, an assessment of what is ‘lost’ (in terms of existing methods and data) necessitates the development of new, innovative methods for metacognition. Development of new methods may prompt the establishment of new standards for documenting metacognition.

Keywords: metacognition, comparative metacognition, uncertainty monitorying, metamemory, quantitative modeling

Crystal, J. D., & Foote, A. L. (2009). Metacognition in animals. Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 4, 1-16. Retrieved from https://comparative-cognition-and-behavior-reviews.org/ doi:10.3819/ccbr.2009.40001

Volume 3: Monograph

Connectionism and Classical Conditioning

by Michael R.W. Dawson,
University of Alberta

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Abstract

The purpose of this monograph is to examine the relationship between a particular artificial neural network, the perceptron, and the Rescorla-Wagner model of learning. It is shown that in spite of the fact that there is a formal equivalence between the two, they can make different predictions about the outcomes of a number of classical conditioning experiments. It is argued that this is due to algorithmic differences the two, differences which are separate from their computational equivalence.

Dawson, M. R. W. (2008). Connectionism and Classical Conditioning. Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 3. Retrieved from https://comparative-cognition-and-behavior-reviews.org/ doi:10.3819/ccbr.2008.30008

Volume 3: pp. 115-133

Use of multiple dimensions in learned discriminations

by Stephen E. G. Lea,
School of Psychology, University of Exeter, UK

A. J. Wills,
School of Psychology, University of Exeter, UK

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Abstract

Many naturally occurring categories vary across multiple stimulus dimensions (e.g. size, color, texture). When humans categorize multidimensional stimuli on the basis of a single dimension this has been taken to indicate use of a rule that could be verbalized. Sorting on the basis of all the stimulus dimensions (‘overall similarity’ or ‘family resemblance’) has been taken to indicate a more basic, implicit, automatic, perhaps associative process. However, a review of the literature on animal discrimination learning shows that animals often discriminate on the basis of one dominant dimension. In recent experiments, situations conducive to more complex cognitive processes have increased family resemblance sorting in humans. In an effort to resolve this apparent paradox, experiments were conducted in which humans and pigeons were exposed to multidimensional category discrimination tasks under closely similar conditions. Preliminary results show no evidence that even a non-verbal rule can be said to be involved in pigeons’ choices in these conditions, despite the fact that under some conditions a single dimension may dominate their behavior.

Keywords: pigeons, humans, category learning, multidimensional stimuli, family resemblance

Lea, S. G. E., & Wills, A. J. (2008). Use of multiple dimensions in learned discriminations. Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 3, 115-133. Retrieved from https://comparative-cognition-and-behavior-reviews.org/ doi:10.3819/ccbr.2008.30007

Volume 3: pp. 99-114

An Evolutionary Framework for the Acquisition of Symbolic Cognition by Homo sapiens

by Ian Tattersall,
American Museum of Natural History

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Abstract

Human beings are unique in their possession of language and symbolic consciousness. Yet there is no doubt that modern Homo sapiens is descendedfrom a nonlinguistic, nonsymbolic ancestor. How might this extraordinary transition have occurred? Slow fine-tuning over the eons is not the answer: the apparent steadiness in hominid brain enlargement over the past two myr is probably an artifact of inadequate systematics, while behavioral innovation was highly episodic in human evolution, and nonsynchronic with anatomical innovation. Evidence for expression of symbolic behaviors appears only very late – substantially after Homo sapiens had arrived as an anatomical entity. Apparently the major biological reorganization at the origin of Homo sapiens involved some neural innovation that “exapted” the already highly evolved human brain for symbolic thought. This potential then had to be “discovered” culturally, plausibly through the invention of language. Emergence rather than natural selection is thus implicated in the origin of human symbolic consciousness, a chance coincidence of acquisitionshaving given rise to an entirely new and unanticipated level of complexity. This observation may undermine claims for “adaptedness” in modern human behaviors.

Keywords: human evolution, language, cognition, symbolism, symbolic consciousness

Tattersall, I. (2008). An Evolutionary Framework for the Acquisition of Symbolic Cognition by Homo sapiens. Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 3, 99-114. Retrieved from https://comparative-cognition-and-behavior-reviews.org/ doi:10.3819/ccbr.2008.30006

Volume 3: pp. 86-98

The social interaction role of song in song sparrows: implications for signal design

by John M. Burt,
University of Washington

Michael D. Beecher,
University of Washington

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Abstract

Many territorial songbirds use singing as an interactive social signal to reduce inter-neighbor aggression. Communication theory predicts that territorial songbirds may use repertoires of signals to indicate graded levels of aggressive motivation. This theory is supported in song sparrows, a species that uses several different song-based signals such as song-type matching to escalate or de-escalate aggression during counter-singing interactions. However, birds cannot type match if they do not share the song type their rival is singing, raising the question of how they might signal aggression instead. We present evidence for two alternative signaling strategies that non-sharing neighbors could use to communicate aggressive motivation. In the first case, a bird may ‘similarity match’ a rival’s song by singing the most similar song in his repertoire, even if he cannot type match. Another solution would be for neighbors to agree to treat specific pairs of non-similar types as matches by convention. The conventional match is potentially a new class of signal that territorial neighbors may use along with type and similarity matching to maintain a repertoire of aggressive motivation signals.

Keywords: song sparrow, bird song, animal communication, song matching, conventional matching

Burt, J. M., & Beecher, M. D. (2008). The social interaction role of song in song sparrows: implications for signal design. Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 3, 86-98. Retrieved from https://comparative-cognition-and-behavior-reviews.org/ doi:10.3819/ccbr.2008.30005

Volume 3: pp. 66-85

Pattern Structure and Rule Induction in Sequential Learning

by Stephen B. Fountain,
Kent State University

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Abstract

When presented with structured sequences to learn, do nonhuman animals abstract and learn relational information-do they induce and learn rules? This paper provides an overview of the current evidence that bears on this question from our recent behavioral and psychobiological research on rat sequential learning. Evidence is presented that rats are sensitive to hierarchical structure in response sequences, that phrasing can bias rats’ perception of pattern structure, that rats induce pattern structures from nonadjacent items in “interleaved” patterns, and that rule learning processes are active concurrently with other learning processes. The paper also describes work on the psychobiology of sequential learning that shows that multiple concurrent cognitive processes can be dissociated by MK-801, an NMDA receptor antagonist, and by other drug and lesion manipulations. Taken together, the results indicate that rats use rule learning processes concurrently with associative learning processes in a wide variety of sequential learning problems.

Keywords: sequential learning, rule learning, hierarchical organization, phrasing, interleaved patterns

Fountain, S. B. (2008). Pattern Structure and Rule Induction in Sequential Learning. Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 3, 66-85. Retrieved from https://comparative-cognition-and-behavior-reviews.org/ doi:10.3819/ccbr.2008.30004

Volume 3: pp. 46-65

Echoic Object Recognition by the Bottlenose Dolphin

by Heidi E. Harley,
New College of Florida
The Seas®, Epcot, Walt Disney World® Resort

Caroline M. DeLong,
University of Hawaii

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Abstract

Object recognition, essential to many animals, often occurs underwater and in poor visibility conditions for bottlenose dolphins. Bottlenose dolphins can use sound through their ability to echolocate in order to recognize objects. Echoic object recognition is an unusual faculty that offers rich research opportunities and is the focus of this article. This review begins with a brief overview of the dolphin’s echolocation system followed by considerations of echoic object discrimination, echoic object constancy, the use of echo trains versus individual echoes for object recognition, and extraction of object feature information from echoes. The authors present new data relating the acoustic analysis of objects with a dolphin’s ability to recognize those objects. The results highlight the potential uses for simultaneous analysis of acoustic and behavioral data in order to understand better which features of echoes and echo trains allow the dolphin to recognize objects across vision and echolocation.

Keywords: echolocation, dolphin, object recognition, biosonar

Harley, H. E., & DeLong, C. M. (2008). Echoic Object Recognition by the Bottlenose Dolphin. Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 3, 46-65. Retrieved from https://comparative-cognition-and-behavior-reviews.org/ doi:10.3819/ccbr.2008.30003

Volume 3: pp. 13-45

Concept Learning in Animals

by Thomas R. Zentall,
University of Kentucky

Edward A. Wasserman,
University of Iowa

Olga F. Lazareva,
University of Iowa

Roger K. R. Thompson,
Franklin & Marshall College

Mary Jo Rattermann,
University of Indianapolis

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Abstract

Generally speaking, the study of concepts in cognitive psychology is anthropocentric with respect to both content and theory. A broader comparative perspective on the various forms of concept learning not only provides a more inclusive view of conceptual behavior, but it also provides a more objective perspective from which to identify underlying processes. We suggest that several of the major varieties of conceptual classes claimed to be uniquely human are also exhibited by nonhuman animals. We present evidence for the formation of several sorts of conceptual stimulus classes by nonhuman animals: perceptual classes involving classification according to the shared attributes of objects, associative classes or functional equivalences in which stimuli form a class based on common associations, relational classes, in which the conceptual relationship between or among stimuli defines the class, and relations between relations, in which the conceptual (analogical) relationship is defined by the relation between classes of stimuli. We conclude that not only are nonhuman animals capable of acquiring a wide variety of concepts, but that the underlying processes that determine concept learning are also likely to be quite similar.

Keywords: concept learning, perceptual classes, associative classes, relational classes, analogical relations

Zentall, T. R., Wasserman, E. A., Lazareva, O. F., Thompson, R. R. K., & Ratterman, M. J. (2008). Concept Learning in Animals. Comparative Cognition & Behavior Reviews, 3, 13-45. Retrieved from https://comparative-cognition-and-behavior-reviews.org/ doi:10.3819/ccbr.2008.30002